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 1 
Introduction 
Individual legislators differ in the degree to which they expend effort to 
cultivate personal votes. Some assign considerable time and resources to 
local affairs and parochial interests, thereby cultivating a personal reputation 
among constituents. Other legislators apparently focus more attention on 
national politics, as policymaker, scrutiniser of the executive or international 
statesperson. Conventionally, candidate-centred electoral systems motivate 
incumbents to cultivate and retain personal votes from constituents, while 
party-centred electoral systems provide less incentive for legislators to focus 
on personal vote gathering (Carey and Shugart, 1995).i The relationship 
appears imperfect, with indications that considerable variation in role-
orientation and actual role-behaviour exists within the same electoral 
environment (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987; Norton and Wood, 1993; 
Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006). Despite the growing theoretical 
significance assigned to legislators’ orientation, researchers have had 
difficulty measuring, empirically, the role-behaviour of individual legislators.  
Instead, increasing reliance accrues to the electoral system as a proxy for 
local versus party-centred interests (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 
2003). 
This study offers two important contributions to the literature on legislative 
role-behaviour. First, the content analysis of parliamentary questions, 
introduced as a novel method for measuring legislators’ focus on personal 
vote earning and parochial interests at the expense of other legislative roles, 
provides distinct advantages over existing measures of role activity. The 
advantage arises from the fact that an analysis of parliamentary questions 
can provide a quantitative indicator of roles legislators perform free from 
many of the measurement problems associated with other methods of 
uncovering legislative behaviour.ii 
A second contribution of this research is the assessment of the common 
assumption that Irish parliamentarians are constituency-focused. Analysis of 
each of the 123,762 content-analysed parliamentary questions tabled during 
the lifetime of the 28th Dáil (1997-2002) reveal the degree of parochial 
interest among parliamentarians. The evidence suggests slightly lower levels 
of constituency-orientation than conventionally believed, with significant 
variation in localism within the same parliament. To address the reasons 
motivating some Dáil Deputies to be more focused on personal vote 
earning strategies, regression analysis tests explanations of variation in role-
behaviour at the individual level. The results call into question many 
assumptions in the comparative literature which posit an electoral and 
institutional origin to constituency-orientation.  
The next section reviews existing research on constituency-centred 
behaviour in Ireland. Section Three explains how an analysis of 
parliamentary questions can provide a quantitative measure of constituency-
centred behaviour. Section Four presents the descriptive data. Section Five 
presents a number of hypotheses and employs the original data to test 
theories of legislative motivation. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
the results and the usefulness of parliamentary questions as a tool for 
measuring role orientation. 
 
Existing Measures of Constituency-centred 
Behaviour 
Cultural and institutional variables emphasise that Irish parliamentarians 
ought to be focused on cultivating personal votes to the detriment of policy 
advocacy at the national level. A political culture that emphasises brokerage, 
the small size of Irish society and the administrative structure apparently 
contributes to a heavy constituent-oriented workload for Irish 
 2 
parliamentarians (Gallagher and Komito, 2010). The Single Transferable 
Vote (STV) electoral system, where candidates from the same party compete 
against each other for votes, motivates incumbents to differentiate 
themselves from co-partisans (Sinnott, 2010) at least in part through the 
cultivation of personal votes (Swindle, 2002; Marsh, 2007). Besides these 
theoretical expectations, little is known about what Dáil Deputies actually 
do. Both the number and penetration of studies in terms of the sample size 
is surprisingly limited. 
Two comparative studies employed interviews to measure the role-
orientation of Irish parliamentarians. In one, Wood and Young (1997) 
interviewed 40 Irish junior deputies, revealing, on average, those interviewed 
spent 2.5 days per week in their constituencies and devoted just less than 50 
hours per week to constituency affairs, which accounted for 58.9 percent of 
their working week. Wood and Young (1997) also found that 22.5 percent 
of those interviewed would prefer to do more constituency service as 
compared to 40 percent who would prefer to do less. Although only junior 
deputies were interviewees, the results provide a significant insight into the 
working life and role of an Irish legislator. 
In the second comparative study, Heitshusen, Young and Wood (2005), 
interviewed 245 legislators from six legislative chambers, including 41 Irish 
parliamentarians between 1998 and 1999. The interviews attempted to 
uncover the relative significance of, and engagement with, constituency, 
party and policy activities. Of Dáil Deputies interviewed, 39 percent ranked 
constituency affairs as their sole primary focus; 19 percent ranked 
constituency as their primary focus along with another priority, and 42 
percent of Dáil Deputies interviewed ranked constituency below some other 
priority. The result of both sets of interviews suggests the level of 
importance of constituency work in Irish parliamentary life.  
Martin (2010) surveyed Irish legislators to discover role-orientation in the 
Oireachtas. The average proportion of the working week spent attending to 
constituency-related activities among those Dáil Deputies who responded to 
the survey was just over 60 percent. Of course, surveys, as with elite 
interviews, suffer from significant methodological problems endangering the 
validity and reliability of findings. To more independently verify the role-
behaviour of legislators, the current research suggests a new method which 
has significant fewer disadvantages when compared to conventional 
methods.  
 
PQs: A Measure of Constituency-Focus 
Parliamentary questions are a feature of almost all national legislatures 
(Norton, 1993:1). Typically, a member tables a question to a minister of the 
government; this action requires the minister to provide an answer. While 
questions can take many forms, the public tends to be most familiar with 
oral questions posed to the head of government (Russo and Wiberg, 2010; 
Salmond, 2010). Yet, most queries and answers assume a written form. 
While some observers question the benefit of questions in terms of the 
general and vague nature of answers provided (MacCarthaigh, 2005), the 
propensity of parliamentarians to ask questions indicates that the 
interrogatories could be an important tool for measuring an individual 
legislator’s job (Franklin and Norton, 1993; Wiberg, 1994). 
This discussion suggests that a content analysis of parliamentary questions 
can uncover the role-orientation of individual legislators. The personal-vote 
earning strategy, if any, of a parliamentarian should be evident in the content 
of questions asked. Parliamentary questions offer a tool both for questions 
of policy and questions of a more parochial, constituency-oriented nature. 
How a legislator chooses to use the questioning tool provides a unique 
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insight into legislative behaviour and role-orientation. To illustrate variation 
in question types, a comparison of three questions, selected from the 
proceedings of the Dáil on a random date in the summer of 2009 is 
revealing: 
[1] Deputy Leo Varadkar asked the Minister for Finance his views on whether the 
Maastricht criteria for entry into the euro could be relaxed to allow one or more of the 
Baltic states or Iceland to come into the euro area in the event of a major devaluation or 
debt default; and if he will make a statement on the matter. 
 
[2] Deputy Leo Varadkar asked the Minister for Education and Science the position 
regarding the provision of a sports hall and extension for a school (details supplied) in 
Dublin 15; and if he will make a statement on the matter. 
 
[3] Deputy Edward O’Keeffe asked the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food the 
position regarding farm grant payments in respect of a person (details supplied) in County 
Cork. iii 
 
The first question clearly relates to a general policy issue, in this case the 
political economy of the euro-zone. In the second question the same Dáil 
Deputy asks about the provision of facilities for a school in his constituency. 
In the third question, an individual constituent is the question’s focus, 
regarding payment due to the constituent from a governmental department. 
The second and third questions are clear examples of a member using the 
institution of parliamentary questions to advance a constituency’s interest or 
the interest of an individual constituent. The written record of the chamber 
is replete with such types of questions, with matters ranging from spending 
projects for a member’s geographical constituency (especially schools and 
public hospitals) to government welfare and other subvention payments to 
individuals. Ultimately, these questions form part of a personal vote-earning 
strategy by the legislator. These locally-oriented questions stand in contrast 
to the many other written questions in which a legislator inquires about 
wider governmental policy. In such cases, the legislator could be said to be 
pursuing a party-vote earning strategy or at the very least, a non-personal 
vote-earning strategy.  
An analysis of parliamentary questions to discover role-orientation provides 
a number of distinct advantages over existing mechanisms used to identify 
personal vote earning behaviour: 
1. An allocation of scarce resources occurs when a member tables a 
parliamentary question. A member must research the question, format it 
appropriately, submit it, and await a reply. This is by no means a costless 
exercise in terms of time and opportunity costs. A legislator, or her staff, are 
effectively limited in the number of questions that can be asked. As such, 
the uses to which parliamentary questions are put provide an indication of 
the priorities of legislators. Although the staff assistance available differs 
greatly between legislatures, even the well-resourced US Senator must make 
hard choices about the allocation of staffing duties. 
2. Unlike most other parliamentary activity, such as legislative voting 
behaviour and parliamentary speeches, the party leadership does not control 
parliamentary questions. Hence, these questions provide a more reliable 
perspective on the choice parliamentarians themselves make for focusing on 
parochial, national, or international issues.  
3. Problems of bias inherent in observational, interview and survey-based 
research, where legislators must actively select into a study, are eliminated 
because the role-behaviour of all legislators can be examined through 
parliamentary questions.  
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4. Instead of relying on a legislator’s recollection and self-analysis of role-
orientation and behaviour, the analysis of parliamentary questions provides a 
direct and unedited measure of role-behaviour. Hence, any difference 
among a parliamentarian’s normative, or indeed empirical, perception of role 
and what behaviour actually occurs, is eliminated. 
5. The data is readily available. Parliamentary questions are on record and 
generally publicly available. In many cases the data is electronically readable, 
making the raw data easily accessible to computer-assisted textual analysis. 
6. Unlike many other data collection methods in role-orientation and role-
behaviour studies, replication is possible, thus enhancing the scientific 
process (King, Keohane and Verba, 1996). To aid replication, specific 
guidelines are used to determine whether or not questions have a national or 
local focus. Table One reports the criteria for identifying local questions 
used in this study, rendering the process of data collection open, easily 
replicable and transferable to other cases. 
It is useful to differentiate between the role of oral questions/interpellations 
and written questions. Certainly, signalling remains an important motivation 
in written questions, along with information acquisition. Yet, these 
motivations typically assigned to parliamentary questions (see, for example, 
Wiberg, 1995) do not compete with a constituency versus policy dichotomy. 
Rather, they are likely to intersect. So, for example, a constituency-based 
question could be an attempt to extract information or to signal interests, 
but regardless it is a constituency-motivated question rather than a policy-
motivated question. 
<Table One around here> 
Parliamentary questions have been assumed to be a mechanism to hold the 
executive branch accountable with little application to cultivating 
relationships with constituents. However, Rasch (2009) found support for 
an electoral connection in Norway, despite the party-centred nature of the 
electoral system. Only the total number of questions asked is considered, 
not the nature or content of the questions. Exploring questioning patterns in 
the French National Assembly, Lazardeux (2005) found no support for an 
electoral connection. Again, the independent variable is the total number of 
written questions submitted by each deputy. The total number of questions 
asked is, at best, a rough proxy for constituency-focused behaviour and 
personal vote earning strategy. Questions can take different forms in terms 
of the content and role orientation being pursued. The novelty of the 
suggested approach here is to extract the constituency-based and extra-
constituency based questions by means of a relatively simple content 
analysis. 
Parliamentary questions are just one of several tools that legislators can use 
to represent local interests. Legislators can write directly to a government 
minister; they can communicate directly with public service providers, and 
they can petition the public service Ombudsman to investigate a 
constituent’s concern. Perhaps, different legislators choose different tools to 
cultivate personal votes. If so, looking at one single mechanism to undertake 
service to a constituency provides an incomplete picture of legislative 
behaviour. Yet, the content analysis of parliamentary questions indicates that 
questions are a standard tool for constituency representation and gathering 
personal votes. Collective needs within the constituency, as well as 
representation concerning constituents’ individual cases, are frequently the 
subject of questions to government ministers. At the same time, 
parliamentary questions are also used to obtain information from, and make 
challenges to, the government on national-level policies. Analysis of 
parliamentary questions, then, is a novel method for gaining insight into 
variation in legislators’ behaviour and personal vote earning strategies. 
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Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that no one method of uncovering 
legislators’ roles is without limitations, a point returned to in the conclusion. 
To highlight the usefulness of content-analysing parliamentary questions to 
measure constituency-centred behaviour and to better understand the 
behaviour and vote-earning strategies of Dáil deputies, the next sections 
reports the descriptive results of the content analyses of Irish parliamentary 
questions. 
 
Are Irish Parliamentarians Constituency-
Focused? 
This study analysed all written questions tabled by Dáil Deputies between 
the 1997 and 2002 general elections. Oral questions are excluded as these 
tend to be held in reserve for the party leadership and frontbench. The 
Ceann Comhairle (presiding officer) and Government Ministers do not 
traditionally table questions and are therefore excluded from the analysis. To 
facilitate the statistical analysis of variations in questioning patterns, the 
analysis also excludes Dáil Deputies who did not serve a full parliamentary 
term, due to factors such as resignation or death. Dáil Deputies elected at 
by-elections during the parliamentary session are also excluded.  
A team of seven researchers hand-coded each written question, with each 
question coded separately by two researchers to ensure maximum validity 
and reliability. Where a dispute arose, the team and the lead researcher 
discussed the question to reach a final decision. Each question’s coding 
included: (1) the member asking the question, (2) the Minister to whom the 
question was addressed, and (3) whether or not the question had a “local” 
focus. The coding criteria for this third element are listed in Table One. In 
total, 123,762 questions were coded.   
Table Two reports the main descriptive results by type of question and 
government ministry. While conventional measures associated with self-
reporting by Dáil Deputies indicate comparatively high levels of 
constituency-orientation this study’s findings do not fully support such 
conclusions. Almost 56 percent of written parliamentary questions are 
characteristically non-local in nature. While a significant proportion of 
questions relate to constituencies, Dáil Deputies do assign resources and 
time to asking questions of a non-parochial nature. These results are not 
heavily biased by opposition frontbench members asking policy-oriented 
questions of government, although these certainly do occur. Indeed, 
backbenchers in each party are just as likely to table written questions as 
frontbench opposition spokespersons.  
<Table Two around here> 
All members of the cabinet, including the Taoiseach, face questions of a 
local nature. However, certain trends are evident. The Department of 
Education and Science account for almost a quarter of all constituency-
oriented questions. A frequent question to the Minister for Education refers 
to the Department of Education’s School Building Programme or the need 
to provide extra staffing resources in a named school in a Dáil Deputy’s 
constituency. After Education and Science, the Department of Health and 
Children is next most likely to be the target of constituency-oriented 
questions, with the issue of staff resources and medical facilitates at a named 
hospital being most common. Questions on the non-payment or delay of 
payment for farm grants account for a significant proportion of questions to 
the Minister for Agriculture. Perhaps surprisingly, the Department of Social, 
Community and Family Affairs accounts for only 3.2 percent of 
constituency-oriented questions asked by Dáil Deputies between 1997 and 
2002. A priori, the expectation might be that representation by 
parliamentarians on behalf of individual constituents on issues relating to 
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welfare payments would account for a significant proportion of local 
questions. This study’s results raise issues regarding the degree to which the 
more disadvantaged groups in society are unrepresented by the 
representative and political processes in Ireland. Interestingly, questions of 
grant payments to farmers outweigh questions of social welfare entitlements 
and payments. 
One result masked in the summary statistics is the presence of significant 
variation in the constituency focus of questions within the chamber. Figure 
one uses a Kernel density plot and histogram to illustrate the spread of the 
percentage of local questions asked by Dáil Deputies. For three 
parliamentarians, local questions did not feature at all in their questioning. In 
contrast, at the other end of the scale, local questions accounted for all 
questions asked by two Dáil Deputies. The median rate of local questions to 
all questions was just over 42 percent, with a standard deviation of 21. To 
better understand such variation, the next section explores the likely causes 
of difference in behavior. 
<Figure One around here> 
 
Explaining Variation in Role-orientation: Is it the 
electoral system? 
 Although personal vote earning strategies are generally assumed to vary 
little within the same legislature, Irish data has uncovered significant intra-
system variation in personal vote earning effort. To help explain this 
variation a number of testable hypotheses are presented and later empirically 
assessed. The first two predictions relate to the impact of the electoral 
system on role-behaviour. We then discuss the likely relationship between 
the electoral environment and non-electoral factors on role-behaviour. As 
such, the framework provides some opportunity to test whether electoral 
system or non-electoral systems factors better explain legislator behaviour. 
Personal vote earning effort should be related to incentives to cultivate 
personal votes. According to the comparative literature, the incentive to 
cultivate personal votes is linked directly to the level of intra-party 
competition as shaped by the electoral system (Carey and Shugart, 1995). 
Variation in the district magnitude in the Irish case allows us test the 
assumption common in the electoral studies literature that district 
magnitude impacts incentive towards constituency-centred behaviour (H1).iv 
A significant but understudied feature of the STV electoral system is that the 
level of intra-party competition varies from candidate to candidate. Larger 
parties often run multiple candidates in the same constituency while small 
parties do not. Given this and the varying electoral success for the larger 
parties, the number of co-partisan incumbents from the same geographical 
constituency differs. In circumstances where Dáil Deputies from the same 
party compete with each other for votes, the incentive to cultivate personal 
votes is greatest, given that party is no longer a label by which an incumbent 
provides differentiation from a party colleague. Greater incentives to 
cultivate personal votes, as determined by the level of co-partisan 
competition, should be associated with higher levels of personal vote 
earning effort (H2).  
It is believed that the margin of victory at the previous election impacts 
legislator behaviour and in particular vote earning strategy (Gaines, 1998; 
Wood and Young, 1997). Legislators in relatively safe seats have less 
incentive to cultivate votes, all else equal. The expectation then is that more 
electorally marginal incumbents spend relatively more time cultivating 
personal votes in an effort to maximise the probability of re-election at the 
next general election. Narrower electoral victories at the last general election 
should be associated with more effort to earn personal votes (H3). 
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Typically, the assumption is that electoral incentives motivate personal vote- 
earning activities. Yet, re-election is not a proximate goal for all legislators – 
some incumbents typically retire at or ahead of a general election. 
Expending effort to cultivate personal votes ahead of retirement would 
challenge rational theories of legislative behaviour. All else equal, 
incumbents seeking re-election are expected to be more constituency-
oriented in their parliamentary questions in comparison with incumbents 
who are not seeking re-election. (H4). 
In Irish politics it is not uncommon for a family member to succeed a 
retiring parliamentarian. A brother, sister, son, daughter or spouse will often 
seek to fill the seat of a Dáil Deputy vacated on retirement. The ‘family 
name’ label can be protected and enhanced by the incumbent working on 
constituency affairs. Where a retiring Dáil Deputy is hoping to retain a 
‘family seat,’ we would expect the incumbent to maintain the same level of 
constituency-centred behaviour as non-retiring Dáil Deputies (H5). 
Being a Dáil Deputy from a government party may have an important 
impact on the pattern of parliamentary questions. Government deputies may 
be required to spend more time on committee work, for example. In the 
Irish case, the government retain majorities on most parliamentary 
committees, resulting in government backbenchers having a larger number 
of committee assignments than their opposition counterparts. Committee 
work may then pull government backbenchers away from constituency 
interests, all else equal (H6). 
The direction of causality in the relationship between legislative seniority, 
defined in terms of years served in parliament, and constituency-centred 
behaviour is not simple. Constituency-centred behaviour possibly explains 
continued electoral success. Alternatively, more junior legislators may need 
to invest greater constituency effort in the absence of a long-developed 
strong personal base in their constituency. Longer-serving legislators can 
rely on past reputation for constituency-centred behaviour and may have 
less incentive towards contemporary constituency-centred behaviour. 
Therefore, a negative relationship is hypothesised between years served as a 
Dáil Deputy and personal vote earning effort (H7).  
An incumbent’s gender may impact their general orientation towards 
constituency over policy and this would be expected to impact the degree to 
which behaviour in the legislative arena is focused on policy over 
constituency interests. For example, because women form a small 
proportion of the chamber, women Dáil Deputies may be more focused on 
policy of concern to women. Bird (2005), looking only at the substantive 
topic of parliamentary questions in the British House of Commons found 
that Women MPs were more likely than male MPs to refer to ‘women’ and 
‘gender’ in questions. We control for the gender of the questioner, expecting 
women parliamentarians to be more policy focused (H8). 
A parliamentarian’s level of education has been found in some countries to 
impact the preference for constituency service. Generally the assumption is 
that legislators with higher levels of formal education are more policy-
driven, in effect spending less time on constituency service (H9). 
The geographical location of a physical constituency from the centre of 
political power is said to shape the demand for constituency service. 
Comparative research has found greater constituency-orientation among 
legislators further removed from the location of the seat of government (see, 
for example, Heitshusen, Young and Woods, 2005). Centre-periphery 
cleavages in the political system mean that Dáil Deputies representing more 
peripheral geographical constituencies are expected to face greater demand 
for constituency-centred behaviour, all else equal (H10). 
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Explaining Variation in Role Behaviour: Data  
To test these hypotheses we employ multivariate regression analysis. The full 
list of variables included in the analysis, as well as the data source for each 
variable is outlined below. The variables are matched to each of the ten 
hypotheses outlined above, providing an opportunity both to explain 
variation in the degree of localism in questions tabled by Dáil Deputies but 
more generally to test the comparative theories explaining the origin of 
constituency orientation. 
The variable PercentLocal is the number of local questions tabled by a 
member for written reply calculated and expressed as a percentage of the 
total number of questions tabled by that member. As discussed earlier, the 
data is based on a hand-coding of written parliamentary questions for the 
period 1997-2002. See Table One for coding criteria. Unless otherwise 
stated the data source for the remaining variables is Nealon (1997).  
District Magnitude is the number of Dáil Deputies returned in the given 
constituency. PercentLocal and District Magnitude are expected to correlate 
positively. Co-Partisan is a dummy variable equal to one where the Dáil 
Deputy was elected alongside a party colleague in the same constituency and 
equal to zero otherwise. As with District Magnitude, Co-Partisan is expected 
to enhance the incentive towards constituency-oriented behaviour, and a 
positive correlation is thus expected between PercentLocal and Co-Partisan. 
Election1997 is the number of first preference votes received by the 
candidate at the 1997 General election expressed as a percentage of the 
quota of votes needed to get elected. In STV, the quota is a key measure of 
electoral success and safety. A negative correlation is expected between 
PercentLocal and Election1997. Run2002 is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the incumbent sought re-election at the 2002 General Election and zero 
otherwise. The data for this variable is from Kennedy (2002). In a separate 
model we include FamilyRun2002, a dummy variable equal to one if the 
incumbent or a close family member sought re-election at the 2002 General 
Election or zero otherwise. The data for this variable is from Kennedy 
(2002) with confirming sources drawn from newspaper election coverage 
(Irish Times and Irish Independent). For both measures, we expect a positive 
correlation with PercentLocal. The variable Government is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the Dáil Deputy was a member of one of the government 
parties and zero otherwise. Years is a continuous variable representing the 
number of years served as a Dáil Deputy. The variable should negatively 
correlate with PercentLocal. The variable Education measures the level of 
formal education attained by each Dáil Deputy and is coded as follows:  
School only = zero; Post-Leaving Certificate/non-University third 
level=one; University = two. A negative correlation is expected. Finally, to 
measure the impact of geography on localism, we include two measures. The 
variable Dublin is a dummy variable equal to one if the Dáil Deputy 
represented a Dublin constituency and zero otherwise. To better empirically 
capture any centre-periphery variation, the variable Periphery is employed 
to measures the contiguous distance of each constituency from Dublin. 
Constituencies outside but contiguous to Dublin score one; constituencies 
contiguous to these score two, and so forth until the most peripheral 
constituencies are coded. A positive correlation is expected.  
 
Multivariate Results  
Members of the government ask relatively more local questions on average 
as compared to members of the opposition. Holding all else equal, the 
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percentage of local questions asked by members of the government party (or 
parties) is eight points higher than the percentage of local questions asked by 
members of the opposition. This finding is robust across the four models 
estimated and reported in table three. Models one and two estimate the 
effect of Run2002. Models three and four estimate the effect of 
FamilyRun2002. Due to the way FamilyRun2002 is coded these two variables 
are not included in the same model. Models one and three estimate the 
effect of Dublin. Models two and four estimate the effect of Periphery. As 
Dublin is the base category for the variable Periphery, the two variables 
cannot be included in the same model and therefore are estimated 
separately. Across all of these model specifications, the estimated coefficient 
on Government is positively signed and statistically significant. This 
demonstrates the Dáil Deputies from the government benches focus 
relatively more of their attention on local questions, contrary to our 
expectations. 
<Table Three around here> 
Dáil Deputies from areas outside of Dublin ask relatively more local 
questions on average than Dáil Deputies from Dublin. Holding all else 
equal, the percentage of local questions asked by Dublin Dáil Deputies is 
more than 14 percent lower than the percentage of local questions asked by 
non-Dublin Dáil Deputies. This finding is robust to alternative model 
specifications. For example, the estimated negative coefficient on Dublin is 
statistically significant in both Model 1, which includes Run2002, and Model 
3, where FamilyRun2002 is substituted for Run2002. Furthermore, an 
alternative measure of the same concept produces similar results. Recall that 
Periphery is a categorical variable coded in such a way as to measure the 
contiguous distance of each constituency from Dublin. The results from this 
variable are reported in models 2 and 4. These results suggest that Dáil 
Deputies outside of Dublin ask relatively more local questions than Dáil 
Deputies from Dublin. In fact, distance from Dublin has a positive 
substantive effect on the percentage of local questions. Dáil Deputies from 
category 3 ask relatively more local questions than Dáil Deputies from 
category 2 who in turn ask relatively more local questions than Dáil 
Deputies from category 1 who in turn ask relatively more local questions 
than TD from Dublin. Dáil Deputies from category 3 ask the most local 
questions, holding all else equal. A percent of local questions asked by a TD 
from category 3 is 23 percentage points higher on average than the percent 
local for a Dublin TD. Although the estimated coefficients for categories 5 
and 6 are positively correlated, they do not reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance. This may be due, in part, to the small numbers of 
observations in these categories, particularly category 6, which contains only 
4 observations. In general, however, we can conclude that Dáil Deputies 
from outside of Dublin ask relatively more local-oriented questions on 
average than Dáil Deputies from Dublin.  
Beyond government party membership and geography, we find no other 
robust predictors of local orientation. The number of first preference votes 
received in the 2007 general election is not a robust predictor of PercentLocal. 
Neither is DistrictMagintude. Although the coefficient is negatively signed, the 
standard errors are so large that the coefficient may not be significantly 
different from zero. In other words, district magnitude appears to have no 
robust effect on the local orientation of Dáil Deputies. Similarly, CoPartisan 
has no robust effect on PercentLocal. The sign and magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient is sensitive to the model specification. This may be 
because there is a relationship between distance from Dublin and/or rural 
constituencies and the number of co-partisans. Standard tests however, 
show acceptable levels of multicollinearity.v Like CoPartisan, the estimated 
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coefficients of Run2002 and FamilyRun2002 are sensitive to the model 
specification. However, neither of these two variables reach conventional 
levels of statistical significant in any of the estimated models. Likewise, 
Years, Gender and Education have no robust effect on PercentLocal. In general 
then, few of the well-established theoretical expectations find empirical 
support in the Irish case. 
 
Conclusion 
 Scholars are increasingly moving beyond studies of elections and campaigns 
to focus on what legislators actually do once elected. At the heart of this 
renewed research on legislative roles is the classic debate concerning the 
underlying motivation of legislators, and in particular whether or not 
legislators are motivated to build personal reputations with constituents or 
work towards building a party and a national reputation. Such motivations 
are important as scholars have theorised links between legislative motivation 
and policy outcomes. 
Determining which, if any, of these competing strategies is most typical 
without being able to empirically measure parliamentary roles is difficult. 
This study proposes a novel method for capturing the constituency-focused 
behaviour of individual legislators. By analysing the content of parliamentary 
questions, a quantitative measure of role behaviour can be extracted. The 
method is non-intrusive; the data reflects actual behaviour as distinct from 
self-reported behaviour, and problems associated with sample bias and 
response rates are eliminated. Unlike other legislative texts, the content of 
parliamentary questions remains relatively independent, with little or no 
party control exercised. Moreover, this method allows the possibility of 
collecting and directly comparing data, over time within the same political 
system, and among different legislatures.  
An analysis of parliamentary questions asked by Dáil Deputies between 1997 
and 2002 indicate that Irish parliamentarians are somewhat constituency-
focused. The immediate implication is that Dáil Deputies may slightly 
misstate their constituency-roles in studies based on self-assessment. The 
validity of research instruments in legislative studies that rely on a legislator’s 
self-perception and self-reporting of activities and role-orientation is 
questioned. That constituency-centred behaviour is possibly overstated in 
interviews and surveys have consequences for scholars using these 
traditional tools to measure competing legislative strategies.  
The statistical analysis seeking to explain variation in the use of 
parliamentary questions as a personal vote-earning strategy produced a 
number of non-trivial findings. The geographical location of the 
constituency relative to the political centre has long been considered an 
important factor in shaping legislators’ behaviour and evidence here 
confirms this. Despite the regularity of this empirical result in most 
countries, the actual reasons why centre-periphery geography impacts the 
level of localism among legislators have largely remained speculative. 
Further research should seek to explain why this is the case. Other 
theoretical expectations are not confirmed in the Irish case – indicating the 
need for further research to understand the origins of personal vote earning 
strategies. 
Although the content analysis of parliamentary questions provides a unique 
prospect from which to measure role-orientation, the general use of local 
questions as a proxy for localism has some limitations. Parliamentary 
questions are just one of several tools that legislators can use to represent 
local interests. Perhaps, different legislators choose different tools to 
cultivate personal votes. If so, looking at one single mechanism to undertake 
service to a constituency provides an incomplete picture of legislative 
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behaviour. Yet, as an unobtrusive measure not dependent on self-reporting, 
parliamentary questions do offer unique advantages in making inferences 
about the preferences, priorities and roles of individual legislators.  
Ultimately, a mixed method approach, combining elements of observational 
studies, self-reporting through interview or survey and the analysis of 
recorded behaviour such as parliamentary questions, provide the best 
opportunity to paint the most reliable possible picture of the life of a 
legislator. At the very least, the empirical work presented here should further 
motivate and encourage scholars to move beyond using electoral systems as 
a general proxy for legislator role-orientation.   
 
 
Bibliography 
Ashworth, Scott, and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. 2006. “Delivering the 
Goods: Legislative Particularism in Different Electoral and Institutional 
Settings.” The Journal of Politics, 68: 168-179. 
Bird, Karen (2005) ‘Gendering parliamentary questions’, The British Journal of 
Politics & International Relations, 7(3), pp. 353–369. 
Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote: 
Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press.  
Carey, John M., and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a 
Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies, 
14(4): 417-39.  
Farrell, David, and Roger Scully. 2007. Representing Europe's Citizens? Electoral 
Institutions and the Failure of Parliamentary Representation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Fenno, Richard F., Jr. 1986. “Observation, Context, and Sequence in the 
Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review, 80(1): 3-15. 
Franklin, Mark, and Philip Norton, eds. 1993. Parliamentary Questions. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Gaines, B. J. 1998. “The impersonal vote? Constituency service and 
incumbency advantage in British elections, 1950-92.” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 23(2): 167-195.  
Gallagher, Michael, and Lee Komito. 2010. “The Constituency Role of Dáil 
Deputies,” pp. 230-262, in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher, eds., Politics 
in the Republic of Ireland, 5th edition.  London: Routledge. 
Heitshusen, Valerie, Garry Young, and David M. Wood. 2005. “Electoral 
Context and MP Constituency Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom.” American Journal of Political Science 49(1): 
32-45.  
Ingall, Rachael E., and Brian F. Crisp. 2001. “Determinants of Home Style: 
The Many Incentives for Going Home in Colombia.” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 26:3: 487-512. 
Johnston, R. J., and Pattie, Charles. 2009. “MPs’ Expenses and General 
Election campaigns: Do incumbents benefit from contacting their 
constituents?” Political Studies, 57(3): 580-591. 
Katz, Richard. 1997. “Representational Roles.” European Journal of Political 
Research, 32(2): 211-226. 
Kennedy, Geraldine, ed. (2002). The Irish Times Nealon's Guide to the 29th Dáil 
and Seanad. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. 
King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1996. Designing Social 
Inquiry. New Haven: Princeton University Press. 
Laver, Michael, and Kenneth Benoit. 2002. “Locating TDs in Policy Spaces: 
Wordscoring Dáil Speeches.” Irish Political Studies 17(1): 59-73. 
 12 
Lazardeux, Sébastien. 2005. “‘Une Question Ecrite, Pour Quoi Faire?’ The 
Causes of the Production of Written Questions in the French Assemblée 
Nationale.” French Politics, 3(3): 258-281. 
MacCarthaigh, Muiris. 2005. Accountability in Irish Parliamentary Politics. 
Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.  
Marsh, Michael. 2007. “Candidates or Parties?: Objects of Electoral Choice 
in Ireland.” Party Politics, 13(4): 500-527. 
Martin, Shane. 2010. “Electoral Rewards for Personal Vote Cultivation 
under PR-STV.” West European Politics. 33: 369-380. 
Monroe, Burt L., and Philip A. Schrodt. 2009. “Introduction to the Special 
Issue: The Statistical Analysis of Political Text.” Political Analysis, 16: 351-
355. 
Müller, W.C., M. Jenny, B. Steininger, M. Dolezal, W. Philipp, and S. Preisl-
Westphal. 2001. Die Österreichischen Abgeordneten. Individuelle  Präferenzen und 
politisches Verhalten. Vienna: WUV-Universitätsverlag. 
Nealon, Ted 1997. Nealon’s Guide to the 28th Dail & Seanad. Dublin: Gill & 
Macmillan. 
Norton, Philip. 1993. ‘Introduction: Parliament since 1960.’ In Franklin, 
Mark, and Philip Norton, eds. 1993. Parliamentary Questions. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Norton, Philip, and David M. Wood. 1993. Back from Westminster. Constituency 
Service by British Members of Parliament. Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky. 
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of 
Constitutions. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Proksch, Sven-Oliver and Jonathan B. Slapin. 2010. “Position-Taking in 
European Parliament Speeches.” British Journal of Political Science. 
Forthcoming. 
Quinn, K. M., B. L. Monroe, M. Colaresi, M. Crespin and D. R. Radev. 
2006. “An automated method of topic-coding legislative speech over time 
with application to the 105th-108th U.S. Senate.” Paper presented to the 
Society for Political Methodology, University of California at Davis. 
Rasch, Bjørn Erik. 2009. “Opposition Parties, Electoral Incentives and the 
Control of Government Ministers: Parliamentary Questioning in Norway,” 
pp. 199-214, in Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler. Festschrift für Herbert 
Döring. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Russo, Federico, and Matti Wiberg. 2010. “Parliamentary Questioning in 17 
European Parliaments: Some Steps towards Comparison.” The Journal of 
Legislative Studies 16(2):215-232. 
Salmond, Rob. 2010. “Parliamentary Question Times: How Legislative 
Accountability Mechanisms Affect Mass Political Engagement.” Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming. 
Scully, Roger, and David Farrell. 2003. “MEPs as Representatives: 
Individual and Institutional Roles.” Journal of Common Market Studies 41(2): 
269-288. 
Searing, Donald. 1994. Westminster’s World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
Sinnott, Richard. 2010.  “The Electoral System,” pp. 111-136, in John 
Coakley and Michael Gallagher, eds., Politics in the Republic of Ireland. 5th 
edition. London: Routledge. 
Swindle, Stephen M. 2002. “The Supply and Demand of the Personal Vote: 
Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Implications of Collective 
Electoral Incentives.” Party Politics, 8: 279-300. 
Wiberg, Matti (1995) Parliamentary Questioning: Control by 
Communication? In: Herbert Döring (Ed.) (1995) Parliaments and Majority 
Rule in Western Europe. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. Verlag, pp. 179-222. 
 13 
Wiberg, Matti, ed. 1994. Parliamentary Control in the Nordic Countries: Forms of 
Questioning and Behavioural Trends. Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science 
Association. 
Wood, David M., and Garry Young. 1997. “Comparing Constituency 
Activity by Junior Legislators in Great Britain and Ireland.” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 22(2): 217-232. 
 14 
Table 1: How to Code Parliamentary Questions  
 
To be coded local, a parliamentary question should have one or 
more of the following characteristics:  
 
1. Did the member mention her/his constituency, for example, by 
saying “in my constituency….” or by identifying the name of 
her/his constituency?  
 
2. Did the member mention a geographical location that the coder 
can confirm to be located in the geographical constituency of the 
member? So, for example “What is the minister going to do about 
unemployment in Mullingar?” would be coded as a local question 
in the Irish case (assuming the Dáil Deputy represented the 
constituency in which Mullingar was located). “What is the 
minister going to do about unemployment in Baghdad?” would 
not be coded a local question by a researcher of Irish questions. 
 
3. Did the member mention a constituent or particular case 
surrounding an individual who can reasonably be assumed to be a 
constituent? 
  
4. Did the member mention a particular building or facility that the 
coder can confirm to be located in the geographical constituency of 
the member?  
 
5. Did the member mention a particular organization or business 
that the coder can confirm to be located in the geographical 
constituency of the member, unless the organisation or business is 
country-wide and the question is not specifically related to the part 
of the organisation or business in the member’s constituency? 
 
6. Did the member mention an event specifically taking place in 
the geographical constituency of the member, such as, for example, 
a local festival? 
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Table 2: Destination Portfolio, and Type of Question Asked 
 
Portfolio 
 
Total 
PQs 
Percen
t of 
All 
PQs 
Total 
Natio
nal 
Tota
l 
Loca
l 
Perce
nt 
Local 
Taoiseach 1839 1.5 1633 206 11.2 
Agriculture, Food and Rural 
Development 
13,61
7 11.0 5574 8043 59.1 
Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and 
the Islands 5571 4.5 2216 3355 60.2 
Defense 4986 4.0 3932 1054 21.1 
Education and Science 
20,90
1 16.9 7875 
13,0
26 62.3 
Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment 5611 4.5 4567 1044 18.6 
Environment and Local 
Government 
10,13
9 8.2 6156 3983 39.3 
Finance 7311 5.9 5215 2096 28.7 
Foreign Affairs 4216 3.4 3852 364 8.6 
Health and Children 
19,98
3 16.1 
10,50
4 9479 47.4 
Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform 
11,46
8 9.3 6412 5056 44.1 
Marine and Natural Resources 4933 4.0 2578 2355 47.8 
Public Enterprise 4464 3.6 2824 1640 36.7 
Social, Community and Family 
Affairs 5577 4.5 3836 1741 31.2 
Tourism, Sport and Recreation 3146 2.5 1982 1164 37.0 
All 
12,37
62 100.0 
69,15
6 
54,6
06 44.1 
 
Notes: Written questions only. Figures excludes questions asked by 
Government Ministers, the Ceann Comhairle (presiding officer) and Dáil 
Deputies who did not serve the full period 1997-2002. See text for coding of 
National and  Local. The title of some Government Departments change 
slightly during the term of the 28th Dáil. 
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Table 3: Breakdown of Local Questions Asked, by Portfolio 
 
Portfolio Percent of Total Local Questions 
Taoiseach 0.3 
Foreign Affairs 0.5 
Enterprise, Trade and Employment 1.9 
Defense 1.9 
Tourism, Sport and Recreation 2.1 
Public Enterprise 2.8 
Social, Community and Family Affairs 3.2 
Marine and Natural Resources 3.6 
Finance 3.9 
Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands 5.8 
Environment and Local Government 7.1 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform 8.8 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Development 15.3 
Health and Children 18.4 
Education and Science 23.8 
Total 99.6 
 
Note: Total does not equal 100 due to rounding.
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Table 4: Explaining Variation in Role-orientation 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
PercentLocal PercentLocal 
   
Election1997 -0.0405 -0.0368 
 
(0.049) (0.049) 
CoPartisan -2.198 -3.794 
 
(3.90) (4.04) 
Run2002 3.439 5.011 
 
(6.83) (6.55) 
Government -8.921** -9.450** 
 
(4.07) (4.13) 
Years -0.00580 -0.00219 
 
(0.27) (0.26) 
Gender 3.113 5.338 
 
(5.01) (5.39) 
Dublin 15.28*** 
 
 
(4.09) 
 
Periphery = 1 
 
6.789 
  
(5.72) 
Periphery = 2 
 
16.25*** 
  
(5.16) 
Periphery = 3 
 
25.27*** 
  
(6.68) 
Periphery = 4 
 
17.68*** 
  
(5.96) 
Periphery = 5 
 
10.01 
  
(6.91) 
Periphery = 6 
 
13.83 
  
(9.97) 
Constant 43.09*** 41.92*** 
 
(12.2) (11.9) 
Observations 126 126 
R-squared 0.15 0.20 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i. Subfields of political science use different terminology to 
describe what are effectively closely related phenomenon. 
Legislative scholars tend to speak of constituency-centred 
behaviour, constituency service and parochialism, while 
electoral studies scholars and political economists tend to talk of 
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the personal vote, candidate-centred systems and localism. The 
latter literature differentiate personal vote earning from party-
centred or strong-party regimes, while legislative scholars tend 
to differentiate constituency-centred behaviour from leadership 
and policy roles. In this study, the terms constituency-centred 
behaviour, constituency-service, candidate-centred, personal 
vote, localism and parochialism are used interchangeably. 
ii. Other methods to uncover behaviour include observational 
studies (see, for example, Fenno, 1986), elite interviews (see, for 
example, Searing, 1994; Müller et al. ,2001), surveys (see, for 
example, Katz, 1997; Farrell and Scully, 2007; Scully and 
Farrell, 2003) and computer-assisted quantitative analysis of 
parliamentary debates (see, for example, Laver and Benoit, 
2003; Quinn et al., 2006; Proksch and Slapin, 2008; Monroe and 
Schrodt, 2009). Even an analysis of travel records and expenses 
can help uncover patterns of role behaviour (see, for example, 
Ingall and Crisp, 2001; Johnston and Pattie 2009). 
iii. Dáil Debates, Vol. 688 No. 1, Thursday, 9 July 2009. 
iv. At the 1997 general election 14 constituencies had a district 
magnitude of five, 15 constituencies had a district magnitude of 
four while 12 constituencies had a district magnitude of three.  
v. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than four for all 
variables included in the estimated models. 
